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This article describes an unconditionally secure quantum bit commit-
ment protocol, QBC3, based on entanglement destruction via forced mea-
surements. Some comments on the current status of the field are also made.
1 Introduction
It is nearly universally accepted that unconditionally secure quantum bit commit-
ment (QBC) is impossible. For a summary of the problem, its brief history and
further references, see [1, 2]. In the following, my current view of the field is
summarized and a new secure protocol, QBC3, is presented.
2 The Impossibility Proof
The general claim of impossibility was made in ref. [3, 4] and criticized in some
detail in [1] and [5]. In my current understanding, there are two major gaps in
the arguments supporting such claims. The first is the assumption that all use of
(classical) randomness in the protocol can be purified via quantum entanglement
that results in an openly known pure state for the parties A and B. The second is
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that any quantum measurement specified in the middle of protocol execution can
be postponed to the end of commitment just before opening. These two points are
related, and both connected to the implicit assumption that entanglement can be
formed and maintained to just before opening.
The first assumption is clearly false by noting that entanglement has to end
at some point, at which the entanglement basis and probabilities can still be de-
termined by random numbers. Such numbers may be physically generated classi-
cally or quantum mechanically, say by throwing a die or heterodyning the vacuum.
They are needed in many classical and all quantum cryptographic protocols. There
is no need for the basis and probabilities to be known to the other party if his/her
security is not affected – we have codified this as the Secrecy Principle [5, 1]. In
particular, this does not violate the Kerckhoff’s Principle, which states that the
adversary is presumed to know the structure of the protocol in cryptography. On
the other hand, the ”community” somehow thinks there is a violation according to
ref. [2].
Similar to the first, the second assumption is true in various types of protocols
but not all. The crucial point is whether the relevant entanglement that is respon-
sible for successful cheating by either A or B can be made or can remain effective
after measurement in the middle of a protocol. If the measurement is replaced by
a unitary description without reading, which appears to permit its postponement
to end of commitment, the above point made still applies when the unitary de-
scription is broken by a party actually taking a reading and announcing it during
protocol execution.
I have insisted, since the beginning in 2000, that a priori there can be no gen-
eral impossibility proof without mathematically representing a common charac-
teristic of all QBC protocols, which has never been given. As Ozawa put it, no-
body calls the Church-Turing thesis the Church-Turing Conjecture or Theorem,
because there is no mathematical definition of a mechanical procedure. It is dif-
ficult to understand on what basis one can claim to have a completely general
impossibility theorem, as allegedly maintained by the vast majority of the ‘com-
munity’ at present [2]. Apparently, much remains to be written to explain just this
point.
3 Exploiting Gaps in the Impossibility Proof
There have been many attempts by different authors to produce protocols that
lie outside the impossibility proof. In my own case, the situation is summarized
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in Appendix A of [1] updated as follows. The exploitation of the first assump-
tion above, in what I called “anonymous states”, is most natural and my QBC2,
QBC3, QBC4 of [1] fall into this category. I presented in the Nov ’05 Quan-
tum Information Meeting in Sendai, Japan, the following results. My QBC4 of
[6] which is identical to the QBC4 of [1], is insecure as it actually falls under
the theorems of my ref. [7] expressed in a different form. Ref. [7] first showed
that A’s cheating transformation could be independent of the classical randomness
or anonymous states employed as shown for two-pass perfectly concealing pro-
tocols. The same independence is obtained for a general class of ε−concealing
protocols, which covers my QBC3. My QBC2 in [1] is a variation of QBC4 and
is similarly insecure. However, my QBC1, which involves the second assump-
tion on measurements in the middle of the protocol, remain secure for reasons
(proofs) I gave in [1], apart from typos. The only conclusion I presented in Sendai
which is probably incorrect is that entanglement cheating is impossible for my
teleportation protocol QBC5 [1].
One of the reasons that error is easily committed in the QBC problem is con-
ceptual – how one should represent certain given physical action mathematically.
Indeed, I believe this act/math correspondence is a fruitful area for future explo-
ration that would not only lead to a more systematic understanding of all possi-
ble protocol formulations and attacks in QBC, but in the foundation of quantum
physics generally.
More general proofs of impossibility relaxing the first assumption have been
given by Ozawa [8] and Cheung [9] independently, and also by D‘Ariano etc [2]
in an algebraic formulation that has not been translated into the standard form.
While it is claimed in [2] that their formulation covers all my protocols, it is not
true for QBC1.
4 Protocol QBC3
My current QBC3 is similar to a previous QBC3 I had that is not secure, its secu-
rity now derived from an added feature from B’s checking before opening which
forces A to make a measurement that destroys his cheating entanglement. Con-
sider the following protocol: B sends A a sequence of n qubits, each randomly in
one of the four BBS4 states | jl〉, je ∈ {1,2,3,4}, named by its position in the se-
quence. A randomly picks one, modulates it by U0 = R(pi/16) or U1 = R(−pi/16),
rotation by ±pi/16 on the great circle containing {| j〉} depending on b ∈ {0,1},
and sends it back to B together with the rest in random order. A opens by reveal-
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ing everything and B verifies. This is a typical preliminary protocol in that it is
at best ε-concealing with A’s optimum cheating probability not correspondingly
close to 1, so that in a sequence of such action a single bit can be committed that
is both ε-concealing and ε-binding. For definitions and terminology, see [1].
This protocol was first given as an anonymous state protocol in which B en-
tangles her randomness with arbitrary probability and basis, but it was found, as
asserted above, that A’s cheating transformation is actually independent of such
information. There are many ways for A to entangle, but the one with the min-
imum ancilla state-space dimension is as good as any [2]. Let |l〉 ∈ HA be the
entanglement ancilla states, P1l the unitary operator exchanging | j1〉 with the l-th






|ℓ〉⊗P1ℓ| j1〉...| jn〉 (1)
where | j1〉 is acted on by Ub. The protocol can be shown to be ε - concealing
similar to the proof given in ref [7], and A can locally turn |Ψ0〉 to |Ψ1〉 near
perfectly.
Consider the following addition to the protocol. Before opening, B asks A
to tell a fraction λ , say λ = 12 , of the n qubits sent back by A chosen randomly
by B for checking. One can choose n large enough so that n2 is long enough for
the ε concealing level. If A claims that fraction contains the committed one, B
would ask to check the remaining 1− λ fraction instead. Assuming, as usual,
that A must open one bit value perfectly, A would have to answer B’s checks
perfectly. The best he can do is to perform a Luders measurement on his ancilla
HA, projecting into the qubits that B picked. If the checking qubits do not contain
the committed qubit from the measurement result, which is then still entangled
with the rest, A succeeds in cheating. If they do, while A has to measure the rest
again to answer B, the committed qubit is already disentangled from the rest and
entanglement cheating for A is no longer possible. Thus, his cheating success
probability is not small, while the protocol remains ε−concealing. This already
contradicts the quantitative conclusion of the Impossibility Proof, for which A’s
cheating probability should be close to 1. The protocol is extended to be a near-
perfect concealing and binding one, QBC3, as usual.
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PROTOCOL QBC3
1. B sends A m segments of n-qubits, each randomly in one of four BBS4
states.
2. A randomly picks one from each segment, modulates them by the same
Ub = R(±pi/16) and sends all nm qubits back to B in random order within
each segment.
3. B randomly chooses half of the qubits in each segment and asks A to tell
what they are. If for any segment A claims it contains the committed one,
B asks to check the other half instead.
4. A opens by revealing the bit and all qubit positions; B verifies.
When A is allowed to open not perfectly for both bits, a continuity argument
may be applied to show security. When A is allowed to be found cheating, two
ways were proposed before to deal with it quantitatively: by further ensemble
checking or by a classical game-theoretic formulation – see the Appendix of ref
[10]. It is clear that some decision has to made on what to do if A or B is found
cheating, they cannot be allowed to go free or they could just keep cheating until
the succeed. In the ensemble checking formulation, the first time a party is found
cheating is taken as failure to cheat in the evaluation of their cheating success
probability. For the game theoretic formulation, a penalty is assigned to each
cheat detection and the total penalty is bounded. Another approach is to add a
“holding phase” [2] between commitment and opening, during which cheating
detection counts as failure to cheat. These different formulations are qualitatively
equivalent, and QBC is unconditionally secure under either formulation. Note that
the formulation in ref [2] does not include a checking action in the holding phase,
and it does not include any penalty on cheat detection. Thus, it does not cover the
present protocol QBC3.
5 Conclusion
The reason for the success of the above protocol QBC3 is similar to that for QBC1,
and has been discussed extensively. In contrast to the 3-pass protocol QBC1,
QBC3 is only 2-pass and has its own distinct clarity on why it succeeds. In par-
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ticular, it should be clear why it is not covered in the formulations of the known
impossibility proofs.
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